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Public interest litigation has historically been an 
innovative judicial procedure for enhancing the social 
and economic rights of disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups in India. In recent years, however, a number of 
criticisms of public interest litigation have emerged, 
including concerns related to separation of powers, 
judicial capacity, and inequality. These criticisms have 
tended to abstraction, and the sheer number of cases 
has complicated empirical assessments. This paper finds 
that public interest litigation cases constitute less than 
1 percent of the overall case load. The paper argues 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to understand the relationship between the rule of law and development. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at vgauri@
worldbank.org.  
that complaints related to concerns having to do with 
separation of powers are better understood as criticisms of 
the impact of judicial interventions on sector governance. 
On the issue of inequality, the analysis finds that win 
rates for fundamental rights claims are significantly 
higher when the claimant is from an advantaged social 
group than when he or she is from a marginalized group, 
which constitutes a social reversal, both from the original 
objective of public interest litigation and from the relative 
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The global reputation of Indian courts, and perhaps their national reputation as 
well, as judicial innovators and as defenders of the interests of the disadvantaged and 
downtrodden, rests largely on Public Interest Litigation (PIL), a new set of procedures for 
expanding access to justice that were developed some 30 years ago. Assessments of PIL 
in India range from the laudatory to the cynical, but recent scholarship has developed a 
widely held narrative that runs like this.
2 PIL or “social action litigation,” as some call it, 
originated in the late 1970s when the judiciary, aiming to recapture popular support after 
its complicity in Indira Gandhi’s declaration of emergency rule, encouraged litigation 
concerning the interests of the poor and marginalized, and to do so loosened rules and 
traditions related to standing, case filing, the adversarial process, and judicial remedies. 
The Supreme Court issued a number of landmark social justice cases in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, including key rulings on the rights of prisoners, bonded laborers, pavement 
dwellers, and children. The frequency of PIL cases in the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts increased as claimants and their lawyers learned how to take advantage of the 
more liberal procedures associated with PIL. By the middle to late 1990s, the range of 
issues the courts were addressing had expanded to include complex environmental 
concerns, such as urban pollution and solid waste disposal, as well as explicitly political 
issues, such as official corruption and elections. At the same time, some claimants and 
their lawyers learned to “dress up” private disputes as PIL. Human rights activists began 
to grow disenchanted with courts’ failure to enforce sweeping directives. Recently, many 
have questioned the appropriateness of judicial intervention in the legislative and 
executive spheres, as well as the constitutionality of the court’s efforts to implement 
many of its expansive orders.
3  
  
  Drawing on that narrative, concerns regarding the value and impact of PIL now 
take a number of forms. These will be described in more detail below, but in general 
terms, they can be categorized into two groups – questions related to the separation of 
powers, and a set of queries regarding judicial attitudes. The first group of concerns asks 
whether courts should be involved in environmental, social, and economic matters at all: 
Are not the legislative and executive branches better equipped to address these matters, 
and does not “judicial activism,” precisely because the courts do not and cannot enforce 
many of their broad directives in these areas, erode the legitimacy of the courts? Are not 
PIL cases draining substantial resources from an already overburdened legal system in 
which ordinary civil cases can languish in courts for many years? Since many PIL cases 
                                                 
2 Elements of this broad narrative are supported in (Upendra Baxi, 1980);(R. Dhavan, Sudarshan, & 
Khurshid, 1985); (Sathe, 2002); (Cassels, 1989) (A. K. Thiruvengadam, 2009).  
 
3 PIL has sparked concerns regarding  judicial encroachment and the separation of powers that actually go 
back to the early days of the Indian Republic. Soon after Independence, the Congress government enacted 
the First Amendment, creating a schedule of laws deemed beyond judicial review, out of concern that the 
judiciary would find planned land reforms unconstitutional, a belief soon to be substantiated in a set of 
cases in which the Supreme Court did just that. This back and forth over land reform, and over the Ninth 
Schedule, continued for decades. Famously, the Court held that Parliament did not have the power to 
amend the Constitution if such amendments abridged the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
(Golaknath v Punjab, 1967) and or altered the “basic structure” of the Constitution itself (Kesavananda 
Bharati v Kerala, 1973), to which the Indira Gandhi government responded by departing from the seniority 
tradition in judicial appointments and attempting to dissolve the Kesavananda majority. On “judicial 
sovereignty” in India, see (Mehta, 2007).   3
are patently frivolous and many others never enforced, is not PIL a device for the 
judiciary to expand its own powers and autonomy under the mantle of a popular social 
justice agenda? A separate set of questions involves the beneficiaries of PIL: Do PIL 
cases continue to benefit the poor and disadvantaged, or have not lifestyle issues and 
middle class concerns become predominant in PIL cases? Are not judges manifestly less 
disposed to the interests of the poor and marginalized than they were two decades ago, 
during the “heroic” years when PIL originated?    
 
  These queries regarding PIL are fundamentally normative claims, and are based 
on principled understandings of the role of judges and courts in India’s democracy. At the 
same time, the validity of some of them rests on facts, albeit complex ones. For instance, 
the challenge related to separation of powers raises questions about judicial capacity – 
critics charge that courts cannot monitor and supervise complex “polycentric disputes” 
(Fuller & Winston, 1978, p. 304), whereas others respond that they can, or at least as well 
as parliaments can (A. K. Thiruvengadam, 2009). The relative effectiveness of judicial 
supervision, if observed accurately and at scale, could help resolve this disagreement, at 
least for a subset of cases and in certain contexts. Similarly, whether or not PIL cases still 
address the concerns of the poor, and whether decisions are as supportive of their 
interests as in the past, are empirical questions. To date, the debate over PIL has largely 
been abstract (with some exceptions, to be described below). It has helped generate a set 
of normatively significant questions, but at this stage of the research cycle, empirical 
work may be more pressing. This paper contributes to that task by assessing PIL with 
empirical data.   
 
The next section of this paper analyzes the argument that PIL constitutes a case of 
judicial overreach. The contention that PIL weakens policy formulation and 
implementation in the legislative and executive branches is typically “dressed up” as a 
separation of powers concern, but a more apt framework involves an assessment of the 
impact of PIL on sectoral governance, which is fundamentally an empirical matter, not a 
doctrinal one. The following section describes the charge that PIL favors middle class 
interests rather than the concerns of the poor and marginalized. That section than presents 
estimates , based on original data taken from Supreme Court records an online legal 




Public Interest Litigation: Is the Judiciary Overreaching? 
 
An old-fashioned view of legal rights holds that most social and economic matters 
do not involve genuine rights because they require positive actions, not merely restraint, 
and have no single, identifiable duty holder. Positive obligations, moreover, entail 
significant expenditures that are the purview of the other branches of government. Courts, 
therefore, should steer clear of the social, economic, and environmental concerns at the 
heart of PIL. More contemporary views (Holmes & Sunstein, 1999; Shue, 1996) hold that 
“for their fulfillment all rights require restraint, protection, and aid from the entity from   4
whom rights are claimed, and that a reasonably effective and well funded state is a sine 
qua non for all rights.”(Gauri, 2004)   
 
Most of the criticisms of PIL in the Indian courts have not taken this somewhat 
old-fashioned form, perhaps because in a country where the scale of needs is so large it is 
hard to say that social and economic priorities are less commanding than civil and 
political ones. They have rather argued that the social and economic domain should be 
largely the prerogative of the other branches of government, which are better equipped to 
analyze, formulate, and implement complex policies, and that much of PIL is 
inappropriate judicial “activism” or “adventurism.” For instance, in an assessment of the 
activities of the Supreme Court in the Delhi Vehicular Pollution and Municipal Solid 
Waste Management cases, Rajamani admonishes that “policy, environmental and social, 
must emerge from a socio political process and must be considered in a legitimate forum 
not a judicial one.”  (Rajamani, 2007) Citing cases in which courts formulated explicit 
guidelines, such as cases related to vehicular pollution, the management of the Central 
Bureau of Investigation, adoption by foreign nationals, custodial torture, and sexual 
harassment, Desai and Muralidhar note that “while in some cases, the Court has 
expressed its reluctance to step into the legislative field, in others it has laid down 
detailed guidelines and explicitly formulated policy” (Desai & Muralidhar, 2000). In their 
2003 article, Rosencranz and Jackson welcome the environmental and health impact of 
the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision requiring the Delhi government to convert its 
commercial vehicles to a fleet running on compressed natural gas (CNG), but then plead 
for leadership on the part of the regulatory and legislative authorities: “Some of the 
roadblocks to CNG implementation could have been avoided, or at least minimized, had 
the conversion been originally mandated through the normal legislative process.” (Armin 
Rosencranz & Jackson, 2003, p. 21) Thiruvengadam documents a spate of similarly 
motivated criticism of PIL as an incursion into lawmaking from sitting and former judges 
on India’s Supreme and High Courts, including comments from Justice Hidyatullah in 
1984, Justice Srikrishna in 2005, and, perhaps most intemperately, Justice Kaju in 2008, 
who said PIL “has developed into an uncontrollable Frankenstein.” (A. K. 
Thiruvengadam, 2009, p. 22)  
 
A motivation for some of this criticism is a suspicion that the courts have used 
their post-Emergency popularity, to which PIL has significantly contributed, to expand 
their own powers and shield themselves from scrutiny and accountability. To some, it 
appears as though the courts may be spending time on frivolous and ineffectual PIL cases 
at the expense of the real administration of justice, and choose to do so because PIL 
burnishes their popularity. Reported instances of frivolous PIL include prayers to rename 
India “Hindustan,” rename the Arabian Sea “Sindhu Sagar,” and replace the national 
anthem for one offered by the petitioner (and partly sung before the Chief Justice) (A. 
Thiruvengadam, 2007). At the same time, the systems of civil and criminal justice suffer 
enormous delays and arbitrary pre-trial detentions.  
 
These concerns are echoed widely enough that there is now visible a clear 
backlash against this perceived usurpation of powers by the courts, including a bill tabled 
in the Rajya Sabha in 1996 to regulate PIL, a 2007 statement by the Prime Minister   5
warning against judicial overreach (Shankar & Mehta, 2008), recent calls from the bench 
to set parameters for PIL (Times of India, December 12 2007), and efforts to establish the 
National Judicial Council, a body to investigate complaints against judges. Some of these 
complaints involve corruption: there have been allegations that some 20% of judges are 
corrupt (Rajeev Dhavan, 2002). Related complaints include the use of the law of 
privileges and contempt on the part of courts to shield themselves from criticism, 
resistance to efforts to require sitting judges to disclose their financial assets, and the 
uncomfortably close relationship between some members of the judiciary and the Bar. (U 
Baxi, 2006) Roy goes so far as to assert that judicial accountability is so low that “we live 
in a sort of judicial dictatorship.” (Roy, 2007)  
 
A few comments about separation of powers are in order. First, policy 
formulation by the courts or its agents is, to some extent, inevitable. Judicial review of 
any sort requires ongoing commentary on laws and policies, including guidelines 
regarding their proper content. Because dispute resolution entails an elaboration and 
application of the normative structures of society as the necessary ground for the dispute 
resolver’s decision, judges inevitably involve themselves in rule making, which is a form 
of lawmaking whether in common law or civil law jurisdictions. (Stone Sweet, 1999) 
Courts have not traditionally been significant actors in the area of social and economic 
policy; and resistance to public interest litigation and the court directives it prompts in 
these areas may stem more from the novelty of the phenomenon than from anything like 
a real “judicial dictatorship.” Reluctance on the part of the Indian judiciary to be held 
accountable for performance and probity is certainly problematic – from the point of 
view of democratic theory it limits the power of the people to review public action. The 
expansion of judicial power in the area of social and economic concerns, on the other 
hand, catalyzes legislative and executive activity more often than it paralyzes it. That is 
because, as an empirical matter the world over, public interest litigation typically spurs 
judicial dialogue with the other branches: rarely do courts issue all or nothing demands, 
backed with common law contempt power or its civil law counterparts,
4 in a way that 
requires the state to restructure its policy framework. “Courts’ decisions do not so much 
stop or hijack the policy debate as inject the language of rights into it and add another 
forum for debate.” (Brinks & Gauri, 2008, p. 304) As Fredman puts it, PIL allows the 
judicial forum to become, potentially, a space for democratic deliberation among equal 
citizens, rather than a place of interest group bargaining, which prevails in the legislature. 
(Fredman, 2008, p. 149)  
 
In addition, an important use of public interest litigation is to make public and 
scrutinize hidden or obfuscatory information, including cost of potential social programs, 
which the state and corporate entities on occasion have reasons to exaggerate or hide. In 
India, PIL during droughts in Rajasthan and Orissa in 2001 disclosed the extent of 
unreleased government grain stocks, and subsequent PIL disclosed that state governments 
could in fact afford to widen several statutory food and nutrition programs, including the 
midday meals scheme in schools, despite official protests to the contrary. In the Delhi 
vehicular pollution debate, the Delhi Health Minister claimed that air pollution did not 
                                                 
4 These would include the astreinte in France; the amparo in Mexico and Venezuela; the tutela in 
Colombia; and the mandado de segurança in Brazil.    6
increase the risks of heart or lung disease, the Delhi government said that the timely 
installation of CNG stations would be impossible, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural 
Gas argued that CNG bus conversion would not be sustainable in the long run, producers 
of commercial vehicles stated that the conversion to CNG was not economically cost-
effective, and other argued that CNG is explosive. The court, largely by empowering 
certain technical committees, played a significant role in helping to ascertain accurate 
information on these issues. It was, moreover, not an instance of judicial fiat but rather a 
judicial-executive branch collaboration: “Government experts essentially became 
advisors to the Court as it drove policy implementation forward.” (Bell, 2004, p. 35) 
 
The argument that PIL constitutes judicial overreach, resulting in poor or 
inefficient decision making, is not really a separation of powers claim. The balance of 
power among government organs, as Madison conceived it, was not primarily about a 
strict separation of powers but “the partial interpenetration of relatively autonomous and 
balanced powers.” (O'Donnell, 2003) In other words, the separation of powers was not 
conceived as a design for the promotion of efficient decision making by preventing undue 
encroachment from one institution upon the prerogatives of another, but rather a check on 
the ability of any group or faction to dominate government from its enclave in a specific 
organization. The doctrine of separation of powers seeks to accomplish this precisely by 
opening certain governmental tasks to competing competences and concurrent powers of 
review. Despite occasionally hyperbolic claims on the part of critics, Indian judges and 
their professional social classes are not using the courts as a staging ground to threaten 
the Indian state. There have been specific rulings, such as Kesavananda Bharati or 
Advocates-on-Record, or the ruling on the Jharkhand legislative procedures, in which 
courts assumed powers not delineated in the Constitution. Even in those cases, it arguable 
that in so doing the Court restored a constitutional balance because the executive and 
legislature had themselves been engaging in extra-constitutional activities.  
 
These criticisms regarding separation of powers are better cast as concerns related 
to the impact of judicial intervention on sectoral governance. Does judicial involvement 
through PIL improve state performance in a given sector? Is forest policy, for example, 
more equitable, efficient, and effective as a result of court involvement? That is an 
empirical question, but most treatments of the issue do not take the empirical challenge 
seriously. (A. Rosencranz & Lélé, 2008) believe that the Supreme Court’s intervention 
following the TN Godavaraman vs Union of India  case (1996) “hurts the process of 
governance,” but adduce little evidence about the capacity and authority of central and 
state executive agencies prior to and after the court’s assumption of powers. Writing in 
2003 on the Delhi vehicular pollution case, Rosencranz and Jackson speculated that 
strengthening the pollution control boards (PCBs), rather than Supreme Court action, 
“would seem to provide the most effective long-term solutions [to air pollution in India]” 
and worried that “the Court’s action seems likely to impede capacity building in the 
pollution control agencies, and thereby to compromise the development of sustained 
environmental management in India.” (Armin Rosencranz & Jackson, 2003, p. 21, 23) 
This is a fundamentally an empirical claim, and one can examine whether PCBs are 
weaker now than they were before the Court got involved in the Delhi pollution case. A 
cursory review suggests that it is not obvious that they are weaker –  the budget of the   7
Central Pollution Control Board has nearly tripled since the year of the Court’s order in 
2002, and a number of efforts are underway to strengthen them and fill staffing vacancies 
in central and state PCBs.
5 Another problem with criticisms like these is that they 
compare an ideal or hypothetical legislative intervention to a real judicial one when it is 
often the real-world failings of the other branches that prompted litigation in the first 
place. Thiruvengadam describes the deliberative failings of India’s Parliament, noting 
that of the total 36 Bills passed in 2008, “16 were passed in less than 20 minutes, most 
without any debate whatsoever.” (A. K. Thiruvengadam, 2009, p. 32)  
 
  Why do analysts tend to describe issues of sectoral governance with the language 
of the separation of powers? The motivation stems in part from a belief, sometimes 
inarticulate, that governance should look similar the world over. In this case, courts, in 
order to be courts properly understood, must limit their tasks to interpreting laws, rather 
than writing or enforcing them. But it is a mistake to speak of “courts” as such. The task 
of judicial institutions depends on the way they interact with the other institutions of their 
society. It is less useful to assess judicial activity against a preconceived institutional 
design than to evaluate, using “normative benchmarks,” the (positive or negative) 
contribution of courts to the key tasks of governance in any specific sector. (Trebilcock & 
Daniels, 2008) In the same way that careful studies of the institutional foundations of 
economic growth in East Asia have challenged the rule of law orthodoxy, showing that 
successful market-sustaining institutions need not take the specific form that courts, 
corporate boards, and bureaucratic agencies have taken in, say, the Untied States or the 
United Kingdom (Ginsburg, 2003), studies of public interest litigation should recognize 
that courts may play a variety of roles in different settings. There is less institutional 
convergence in the world than believed, and it is important “not to confuse institutional 
function and institutional form” (emphasis in original). (Rodrik, 2003)  
 
What, then, are the normative benchmarks that should be used to assess the 
contribution, or lack thereof, courts toward sectoral governance? Those depend on the 
sector, of course – they would look different in health than in forestry. But, generalizing, 
one can identify three key elements of governance for the broad category of tasks in 
government service delivery: the capacity and authority of the organizations charged with 
delivery or oversight, the availability of information and transparency regarding service 
delivery, and state accountability for performance.  An empirically minded assessment of 
PIL in India, then, would take the form of a series of case studies based on those 
normative benchmarks. The case studies would focus on these questions:   
 
1.  Did the capacity and authority of institutions tasked with addressing the social 
problems increase or decline as a result of PIL? 
 
                                                 
5 The sanctioned budget was Rs 1592.58 lakhs 2001-02, and 4500.00 lakhs for 2007-08. These budgets are 
available at http://www.cpcb.nic.in/upload/AnnualReports/AnnualReport_6_annualreport2001-02.pdf 
and http://www.cpcb.nic.in/upload/AnnualReports/AnnualReport_34_final-report-06-07-A.pdf 
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2.  Was accurate information on sectoral concerns more widely available before or 
after judicial intervention? 
 
3.  Were mechanisms of accountability, including legal and hierarchical oversight, 
markets and the power of actors to pursue their own interests, and social 
assessments of the motives of public officials, functioning more effectively before 
or after judicial intervention? 
 
Does Public Interest Litigation Benefit Marginalized Individuals and Groups? 
 
The purpose of Indian public interest litigation, like most social causes, was likely 
over-determined; but most historians agree that it was partly an effort on the part of the 
courts to speak to the poverty, social exclusion, and powerlessness that the majority of 
citizens in India continue to suffer. Several commentators suspect, however, that this 
objective for PIL has not been realized, or indeed has been lost. These criticisms take two 
forms. The first focuses on beneficiary inequality: the concern  that the middle classes 
have more organizational and financial resources than the poor, which facilitate easier 
access to courts, and results in more benefits from PIL for them than the poor. In some 
countries, the Bar develops a pro bono practice that, to some extent, mitigates this 
inequality of access, but this has not emerged in a significant way in India. Compounding 
this problem, NGOs and social movements in India are wary of courts, and largely do not 
utilize litigation strategies to achieve their objectives (Krishnan, 2003; Shankar & Mehta, 
2008).  
 
The second is policy area inequality: this is the concern that judges, because of 
their social class and ideological dispositions, are more alert to the concerns of the middle 
classes and the wealthy. This is evident, critics argue, in the demonstrable urban and 
middle-class bias of their rulings. Baxi believes that the interests of global economic 
elites now color the thinking of the Indian judiciary, resulting in rulings that benefit those 
global elites, such as decisions in the cases involving WTO accession, Union Carbide’s 
liability for toxic emissions in Bhopal, and the construction of the Narmada dam. (U 
Baxi, 2006) Similarly, Rajagopal believes that the Indian courts have adopted the statist 
and development mindsets associated with the Indian state itself, and that the universal 
privileging of civil and political rights over socioeconomic rights has affected the 
thinking of the Indian judiciary (Rajagopal, 2007). In a related vein, Ramanathan writes 
that “increasingly, the constituency on whose behalf the enhancement of judicial power 
has been strengthened began to emerge as the casualty of the exercise of that power.” 
(Ramanathan, 2002) 
  
These claims tend to be based on a set of exemplary cases, rather than a 
systematic review of PIL case law and implementation. It is also important to realize that 
judges, and the courts that they constitute, are creatures of their environment, and that 
patterns of judicial recruitment and appointment will almost always ensure that courts 
reflect the dominant political trends of their countries (Dahl, 1957). Some argue that the 
Indian courts are an exception to this rule, having obtained as much, if not more, 
autonomy regarding judicial appointments than any other courts in the world. But that   9
constitutional autonomy is constrained by the Indian civil service traditions under which 
courts operate, as well as the social dependence of judges on the Bar and on political and 
economic elites. “Leaders of the Indian Bar,” writes Baxi,  “whether elected or otherwise, 
have always wielded historically disproportionate influence over the Justices.” (U Baxi, 
2006) In addition to the embedding of judges in their social and political milieu, strategic 
factors also limit judicial autonomy: courts in every country depend on the other branches 
of government for their political survival, so they will, by and large, take care that their 
decisions garner sufficient support from key political actors (Epstein & Knight, 1998; 
Gauri & Brinks, 2008b). In short, because ideological orientations in the larger Indian 
political economy have drifted rightward over the past two decades or so, it is to be 
expected that the courts have followed. Assessments of the extent to which PIL supports 
the poor, then, need to develop an implicit benchmark of what can be expected of courts 
in the specific contexts in which they operate.
6  
 
There are a set of empirical questions on PIL answers to which might guide these 
assessments: 
 
4.  What share of PIL cases have claimants who are not poor, and has this share 
changed over time? 
 
5.  How many PIL cases have NGOs or CSOs as counsel or supporters, and has this 
changed over time? This is important because NGO- or CSO-led cases typically 
involve collective claims that have a greater likelihood of generalizing benefits to 
an entire class of similarly situated people, such as the poor or scheduled castes, 
scheduled tribes, and other backward classes (SC/ST/OBC).  
 
6.  What is the win-loss rate for PILs, and for PILs of different types? Do these win-
loss rates vary with the social class of the claimants? 
 
 
To fill in some of the information needed for a more complete assessment of PIL 
in India, four different samples of PIL and Fundamental Rights cases at the Supreme 
Court level were examined: (i) cases that, according to the Supreme Court registrar’s 
office, the Court has itself classified as PIL from 1988-2007 (some 2800 “cases” overall); 
(ii) all Supreme Court cases in the Manupatra database that involved Fundamental Rights 
and that addressed concerns regarding women and children rights, whether or not 
explicitly admitted as PILs (86 cases); (iii)  all Supreme Court cases in the Manupatra 
database that involved Fundamental Rights and were related to issues regarding 
SC/ST/OBCs, whether or not explicitly admitted as PILs (180 cases); (iv) all Supreme 
Court cases in the Manupatra database that the Supreme Court explicitly called a PIL (44 
cases).  
 
                                                 
6 For an extended discussion of inequality in social and economic rights litigation, see (Brinks & Gauri, 
2008)  
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For the set of cases involving women and children’s rights, these search terms, 
among others, were used: "women" and "children" and “abuse”; "violence" and "women" 
and "neglected children"; “juvenile justice" and "Article 21"; "trafficking" and "women" 
and "Article 21"; "labour" "children" and "Article 14" ; "custodial violence" and 
"children"; "education" "fundamental right" and "Article 14"; "gender and fundamental 
right"; "prison rights and children"; "rape" and "Article 21"; "emancipation" and "women 
and children." The SC/ST/OBC search used the terms “scheduled caste” or “scheduled 
tribe” or “other backward classes” in conjunction with cases that addressed Fundamental 
Rights and constitutional concerns. Note that the data from the Supreme Court were a 
listing of orders related to PIL cases, and not necessarily a list of cases per se. But an 
examination of the names of the cases revealed that of the 2,800 separate orders, 
instances of duplicate or once repeating nearly identical plaintiff and defendant names 
occurred fourteen times, triplicates once, and quadruplicates once. Still, because of 
uncertainty regarding the basis for the listings, this paper refers to this list as constituting 
“cases” rather then cases per se. The Manupatra database captures about 80-85% of 
Supreme Court cases.
7 While this results in something less than complete compendium of 
Court decisions and orders in the selected topic areas, there is no evidence that the 
database censors certain categories of cases in a systematic fashion. There is no evidence, 
in other words, of significant sample bias.  
 
Figure 1 shows the number of PIL “cases” instituted per year, whether brought to 
the court for admission (“admission matters” in the Court’s terms) or argued on the 
merits (“regular matters”), from 1997-2007, based on data from the Supreme Court itself. 
The figure shows that there has been a slight upward trend in PIL matters over the last ten 
years. It also shows that there are some 260 “cases” instituted per year, on average. This 
compares to about 60,000 “cases” per year overall, based on data publicly available in the 
Supreme Court’s “Court News” publication.  So, on average, some 0.4% of “cases” 
before the Court involve PILs. This suggests that PIL does not drain significant Court 
resources from the administration of day to day justice, contrary to the claims of some 
critics; but it also suggests that the outsize reputation of the Supreme Court’s PIL work 
belies its modest scale. And, contrary to popular conceptions, the large majority of the 
260 or so PIL “cases” instituted in the Supreme Court each year are brought through 
formal channels; of the tens of thousands of letters and handwritten petitions that the 




The Court instituted a classification system for PILs in 1988. This might be used 
to determine whether the concerns cited in PILs have changed over the years, and if the 
“cases” that appear before the Court have shifted to the concerns of the middle classes. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown by “case” type and year. Unfortunately, the large majority 
of “cases” fall in the category of “other,” so the classification scheme is not useful for 
tracking changes in PIL composition over time. Noteworthy, however, is the increase in 
“cases” related to election commissions, and the relatively low share of “cases” involving 
                                                 
7 Reported by Nick Robinson, based on personal communication with Manupatra staff, January 14, 2009. 
Also see the similar figure in (Shankar & Mehta, 2008) 
8 Interviews with officers of the PIL section, Supreme Court, New Delhi, January 13, 2009.   11
bonded labor and criminal justice, two of the concerns crucial in the early justifications 
for PIL.  
 
Have increasing numbers of cases involved middle class concerns? It is difficult 
to say for PILs more generally because an identifiable record of PIL cases is not 
available. To address this question, the paper used the set of Fundamental Rights cases 
described above. Fundamental Rights cases, at least those related to women and 
children’s rights and SC/ST/OBC concerns, may in fact underestimate the orientation of 
PILs to the middle classes because they exclude issues like urban quality of life that have 
been the concern of recent prominent litigation.  
 
Figure 2 shows the number of cases in categories related women and children’s 
rights or to SC/ST/OBC issues, or which the SC explicitly called a PIL, as reported in 
Manupatra, in which the claimant was likely to have been, on the basis of a review of the 
written opinion, a member of the “advantaged classes.” For purposes of the coding, a 
member of the advantaged classes included a professional (doctors, teachers, members of 
the armed services, etc), a landowner or business person, or someone otherwise in the 
global middle class (including formal sector workers and civil service employees not 
designated as workers or laborers). Those not in the advantaged classes included those 
belonging to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe or a member of the other backward 
classes (unless otherwise designated a member of an advantaged class), peasants, 
laborers, and those detained in the criminal justice system. Where groups or publicly 
minded individuals made claims in courts, and where there was no obvious plaintiff, the 
coders attempted to identify the general social class of the individuals whose interests 
were being advocated or defended. In 48 of the 310 cases in the sample (some 23%), the 
social class of the claimant(s) could not be discerned from the written opinion; or, and 
this was the more frequent problem, the social class was diffuse. Examples of this 
included cases concerning environmental protection of rivers and forest, challenges to the 
constitutionality of judicial action, and challenges to the statutory definition of rape. For 
these cases, the calculations and figures below considered the observation to have a 
missing value for social class. For every case, an effort was made to identify the 
individual or class of individuals on whose behalf the case was instituted – in some 
instances the lawyer or some other publicly minded individual is listed as the 
plaintiff/complainant in official records, but the claimant was coded was the person or 
class of persons whose interests the case was seeking to advance (e.g., child bonded 
laborers).  
 
Figure 2 plots the number of cases involving Fundamental Rights in the categories 
described above, and the number of cases in which the claimant was a member of the 
advantaged classes. Simple OLS estimates are used to identify trend lines, which are 
inserted in the figure. The trend lines show that the number of claimants from advantaged 
classes has increased at almost the same rate as the overall number of Fundamental 
Rights cases in these categories. This suggests that class bias concerns that stem from the 
organizational advantages of the advantaged class are not as pronounced as some have 
feared.  
   12
Another way to examine this problem of inequality in organizational resources is 
to look the share of Fundamental Rights cases in which the rights violation originated in 
the BIMARU states. Figure 3 plots the share of cases originating in the BIMARU states. 
(In 14% of the cases, the location of the rights violation was national or otherwise 
impossible to pinpoint.) Figure 3 shows that although that number of cases originating in 
rights violations in the BIMARU states has been increasing, it remains below the share of 
the national population residing in those states (some 40%). This suggests that 
inequalities related to middle class legal mobilization, though real according to this 
measure, are declining.  
 
Finally, the data allow a third way to examine the issue of middle class legal 
mobilization advantage – one can identify for each year the share of cases initiated by or 
involving an NGO or cooperative group. Cases that involve an NGO or cooperative are 
more likely to involve the concerns of the poor than the middle class, and are also more 
likely to result in generalized benefit than cases brought on behalf of individual private 
claimants by private lawyers (Gauri & Brinks, 2008a). Overall, 15% of cases were filed 
by cooperatives, groups, or NGOs, while 80% were filed by individual litigants (4% of 
cases were unclear). Figure 4 shows that the annual number of cases filed by a 
cooperative/group and reported in Manupatra has been more or less flat since the 1970s, 
with a median number of about one per year, and has not grown as fast as cases involving 
Fundamental Rights filed by individuals. This suggests that although the absolute number 
of Fundamental Rights claims brought on behalf of disadvantaged classes has been 
increasing, as shown in Figure 2, this increase is not due to greater mobilization by 
NGOs/CSOs; rather, it appears to have been the result of increased mobilization by 
private individuals.  
 
To examine policy area inequality, which is related to the content of judicial 
rulings on the cases that reach them, we examined win-loss rates, both in general and for 
subsets of claims from advantaged classes, disadvantaged classes, members of 
SC/ST/OBC, and the middle and upper castes. Figures 5 and 6 show that claimants in 
cases involving women’s and children’s rights were more likely to win than claimants in 
cases involving SC/ST/OBC matters. Overall, the win rate for claimants in Fundamental 
Rights cases involving women and children’s rights was 84%, compared to 51% for cases 
involving SC/ST/OBC, and 72% for the explicit PIL cases. In addition, the trend line for 
the win rate of claimants in SC/ST/OBC cases was sloped downward. That suggests that 
judges may now be less favorably disposed to SC/ST/OBC claims than they were in the 
past.  
 
But it is hard to tell whether this indicative trend is a function of the change in the 
composition of the claimants or a change in judicial attitudes; in other words, it is 
possible that judges are as favorably disposed to SC/ST/OBC concerns as they were in 
the past, and that win rates in SC/ST/OBC cases have declined only because most 
claimants in these cases are now members of the advantaged classes. So the cases were 
further disaggregated on the basis of the social class of the claimant. Overall, 67% of 
claimants in SC/ST/OBC cases were themselves members of SC/ST/OBC; but this falls 
to 60% for cases admitted after 2000, indicating a recent increase in claims related to   13
SC/ST/OBC by members of the middle and upper castes. For women’s and children’s 
rights cases, overall 72% of claimants were members of the advantaged classes.  
 
Figure 7 graphs the win rates in all Fundamental Rights cases for claimants who 
were and were not members of advantaged classes. It shows that the average annual win-
rate for claimants from advantaged classes was below the win rate of claimants who were 
not from advantaged classes until the late 1980s. Now claimants from advantaged classes 
have higher win rates than claimants not from advantaged classes. For example, 
advantaged class claimants had a 73% probability of winning a Fundamental Rights 
claim for cases in which an order or decision was rendered from years 2000-2008, 
whereas the win rate for claimants not from advantaged classes for the same years was 
47%. For the 1990s, rates were 68% and 47%, respectively. But in the years prior to 
1990, claimants not from advantaged classes enjoyed higher success rates than those 
from advantaged classes. The differences for the 1990s and 2000s are significantly 
different from each other, based on a simple chi-square test and a simple probit 
estimation (see Tables 2a and 2b). Similarly, when one divides the claimant into those 
that are identified as members of SC/ST/OBC and those that are not, the same pattern 
emerges: Figure 8 shows that claimants who are not SC/ST/OBC now have a higher win 
rate than those who are. Even in the subset of cases involving SC/ST/OBC concerns, 
claimants who were not from SC/ST/OBC began to have higher average annual win rates 
than those who were starting around 1990 (see Figure 9).
9  
 
These findings are consistent with the claim that judicial receptivity in the 
Supreme Court to Fundamental Rights claims made on behalf of poor and excluded 
individuals has declined in recent years. There are other explanations, however. The 
decline in the win rates for marginalized individuals could be attributed to the fact that 
cases brought on their behalf are weaker, on the merits, than they used to be, perhaps as a 
result of changes in statutes, decisions to litigate more challenging cases, or weaker legal 
representation. Each of these possibilities warrants careful scrutiny. Still, the data 
demonstrate not only a decline in the win rate for marginalized individuals but a 
simultaneous increase in the win rate for advantaged individuals. Though not impossible, 
it is unlikely that that the quality of legal representation has simultaneously increased for 
the advantaged and decreased for the marginalized, and sufficiently to explain the 
significant reversal in win rates. Similarly, it is conceivable but not likely that advantaged 
clients started to select a less challenging set of cases at the same time that marginalized 
claimants did the reverse. The data here constitute a prima facie validation of the concern 
that judicial attitudes are less favorably inclined to the claims of the poor than they used 
to be, either as the exclusive result of new judicial interpretations or, more likely, in 




  A number of criticisms of PIL have been voiced in recent years, including 
concerns related to separation of powers, judicial capacity, and inequality.  While critics 
                                                 
9 The social class of the claimant was not discernible in 1% of the cases related to SC/ST/OBC, 34% of 
cases related to women’s and children’s rights, and 45% of explicit PIL cases.   14
have been persuasive when pointing to particular cases, the sheer number of cases, as 
well as the variation in tendencies over time and among court benches, have made 
reaching a general conclusion difficult. This paper has argued that complaints related to 
separation of powers concerns are better understood as criticisms of the impact of judicial 
interventions on sectoral governance, and that structured case studies of sectoral 
governance are necessary to assess those criticisms. On the issue of inequality, this paper 
contributes to an overall assessment by systematically examining the relative magnitude, 
case composition, and geographical origins of, as well as legal representation and the 
claimant’s social class in, PIL and Fundamental Rights cases that reached the Indian 
Supreme Court.  
 
The analysis of PIL “cases” shows that they do not appear to consume a significant 
share of the resources of the Supreme Court; they constitute less than 1% of the overall 
case load. The subject matter of PIL cases and orders remains difficult to discern because 
over 70% of them are classified as “other,” which is problematic from the point of view 
of judicial transparency. Concerns regarding inequality appear to be validated by some of 
the quantitative data on Fundamental Rights cases. On the one hand, although the number 
of Fundamental Rights cases related to women and children’s rights and to the concerns 
of scheduled caste/scheduled tribe/other backward classes, as well as cases explicitly 
called a “PIL” in the Court’s written opinions, appear to have increased; and the rate of 
increase has been similar for claimants belong to both marginalized and advantaged 
population segments. The share of cases from BIMARU states also appears to be 
climbing. On the other hand, a very low share of the cases are brought by cooperative 
entities, such as NGOs, which is a useful predictor of the likelihood that benefits will 
generalize to the larger population. Most striking, win rates for Fundamental Rights 
claims are now significantly lower when the claimant is from an advantaged social group 
than when he or she is from a marginalized group. That constitutes a social reversal both 
from the original objective of public interest litigation and from the relative win rates in 
the 1980s.    15
Table 1 
Fundamental Rights cases in the Indian Supreme Court,  % of Cases Submitted by Subject Matter 
Subject  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
             
Child Labour Matters 
Including Neglected Children 
  0.4        0.49    0.73   
Air Pollution Matters, i.e. 
Industrial, vehicular, Power 
Stations etc. 
2.58  2.8  2.58 2.34 5.32  8.3  5.78 2.44 2.89 2.19 2.88 
Water Pollution: Industrial, 
Domestic, Sewage, Rivers and 
Sea 
1.94 6.4 2.58 4.3 2.84  0.72  2.22  1.46  18.18  2.19  1.44 
Noise Pollution: Industry & 
Vehicular 
0.65  1.2  0.43  0.35  1.81  1.33  0.83  1.46  
Ecological Imbalance: 
Protection and Conservation 
of Forests throughout the 
Country, Protection of wild 
life, Ban on Felling of Trees 
and Falling of Under Ground 
Water Level 
8.39  3.2  3.43 2.73 3.19    4.44 5.85 7.85  16.06  12.98 
Bonded  Labour  Matters  2.58  0.4  1.29     4.33       0.48 
Matters relating to Custody 
Harassment, Jails, Complaint 
of Harassment, Custodial 
Death, Speedy Trial, 
Premature Release, Inaction 
by Police etc. 
3.87  2  1.72  1.56  0.35  0.44    0.36  0.96 
Matters relating to Harassment 
of SC/ST/OBC and Women 
0.65  0.4      1.42 0.36 0.89 0.49    0.36 0.48 
Matters relating to 
Unauthorized Constructions 
including Encroachments, 
Sealing, Demolitions, Urban 
Planning 
3.23  3.6  1.72 5.47 2.84    1.33 0.98 2.07 2.92 1.44 
Matters relating to Election 
Commissions 
1.29  1.6  1.72 0.39 1.42 3.25 0.44  7.8  3.72 3.28 5.77 
Scam  Matters  1.94  0.43  0.39  0.36  0.98  0.83  0.36  0.48 
Others  72.9  78  84.12 82.81 82.27 80.87 83.11 79.51 63.64 70.07 72.6 
Natural and Man Made 
Disasters Including Riots 
           0 . 4 8  
Numbers are in Percentages 
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Table 2a: Win rates in selected Fundamental Rights before the Indian Supreme Court, 







57.9% 68.1%  73.3% 
Disadvantaged 71.4%  47.1%  47.2% 
 
* probability of χ






Table 2b: Probit estimation of win rates for advantaged classes in Fundamental Rights 
cases before the Indian Supreme court, by decade 
 
 1961-1989  1990-1999 2000-2008
 














80 114  66 
Pseudo R
2 0.02  0.03  0.05 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at p < 0.05  17
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